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Petitioner DENNIS J GARCIA responds to the BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT as follows.
PETITIONER'S REPLY ARGUMENTS
The BRIEF OF RESPONDENT---in which the substantive
"argument" thereof is but a mere five pages of text---is, on
all material issues, superficial and inadequate in its
response to the issues raised in the case. The State's
arguments fail to meaningfully analyze the issues; the State
asserts conclusions which totally "miss" the more meaningful
significance of cases. The Respondent fails to even mention,
let alone address, the "stare decisis" issue arising from
5the Schultz decision by a former panel of the Utah Court of
Appeals.
I
THE STATE'S "IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES"
IS FALSE AND INTENTIONALLY MISLEADING
 
On the page "i" of the BRIEF OF RESPONDENT---submitted
above the signatures of THE Attorney General of the State of
Utah, of the Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor
General (and signed by the Assistant Solicitor, Mr Burnett),
the State makes the following statement under its "List of
All Parties":
To the best of Respondent State of Utah's
knowledge, all interested parties appear in the
caption of this Brief.
Emphasis added. The second (and concluding) sentence of the
Paragraph---although technically accurate in its substance--
-is confusing and intentionally misleading. That sentence
states:
The Utah Board of Pardons and Parole and the
Utah Office of Debt Collection are entities of the
State of Utah.
The first sentence (i.e. "To the best of Respondent
State of Utah knowledge . . .") is all encompassing: it
affirmatively identifies the entire State government, and
not merely the individual knowledge of the three attorneys
who have submitted the BRIEF in behalf of the State.
Likewise, the term "all interested parties" is used,
albeit for an apparently misleading and disingenuous
6purpose.
The statements---individually and in combination with
each other---intentionally mislead and ignore the voluntary
"intervention" effected in January 2014 when the Board of
Pardons and the Utah Office of Debt Collection, through
separate Assistant Attorneys General (Ms Reber and Ms Jex)
moved the District Court to allow their voluntary
"intervention", as the claimed "real-parties-in-interest"
for the case at that time. Their motions for intervention
were granted by the District Court. Thereafter, the two
entities and their counsel filed hundreds and hundreds of
pages of materials in their opposition to GARCIA's set aside
motion. See RECORD at 155-275.
At no time thereafter has either State agency moved to
"withdraw" from the case. That the case was initially
"appealed" by GARCIA from the District Court and later
petitioned for certiorari review by GARCIA required no
action on the part of the State agencies (the Board of
Pardons and the Office of Debt Collection) to stay in.
Accordingly, the State's assertion that only the State of
Utah is in the case is misleading, even fraudulent upon the
Court.
While the State's motives in suppressing the agencies'
continuing involvement in the case has not been explained
(nor has any formalized withdrawal from the case been
7identified by the State's appellate counsel), perhaps a
reason the State presently desires to "hide" its agencies'
former "intervention" into the case is that such
intervention contradicts the State's position: that the
District Court had "no jurisdiction" following sentencing.
Thus, there was no case into which to "intervene".
Application of the principle of "judicial estoppel" would
preclude the State from now denying (or ignoring) the
previous "intervention" of its agencies and the judicial
"judgment" they obtained from the participation. [There may
be other reasons for the State's motivation to "hide" the
previous intervention (and the effect thereof) of its
subordinate agencies into the "case".]
If the two State agencies are---as the attorneys now
represent---no longer "interested" (State's term) in the
case, then the Court should consider the State's "defenses"
to the GARCIA "set aside" motion to be moot (and/or
abandoned) and enter summary relief in GARCIA's favor.
The asserted "no interest" statement is disingenuous,
given the fact that as recently as this last spring (i.e. in
2017) collection agencies representing the Office of Debt
Collection have sent GARCIA "demand letters" demanding
payment of the District Court's judgment.
8II
THE STATE IGNORES THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE
THE STATE ITSELF CHARACTERIZES AS "CONTROLLING"
On page 2 of the RESPONDENT'S BRIEF the State
identifies Subsection 77-27-6(4), Utah Code, as a
"determinative statute", for which the "controlling
provisions" are identified. The State then and there quotes
the statutory text, including the first sentence thereof
which expressly includes the "within 60 days" requirement.
The "within 60 days" requirement---which is also identified
within Subsection 77-27-6(2)---is (and has always been) the
"core" basis for GARCIA's "set aside" motion. The Court
should follow the statutory provisions which the State
itself characterizes as "determinative" and "controlling".
III
THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING SECTION 77-27-5(3)
ARE FLAWED, INCORRECT AND MISLEADING
On page 2 of RESPONDENT'S BRIEF the State identifies
Subsection 77-27-5(3), Utah Code, to be "determinative" and
"controlling". This conclusion and assertion is flawed,
incorrect and misleading.
This "petition for certiorari" reviews the Utah Court
of Appeals DECISION. In the DECISION the Court of Appeals
did NOT base its "no jurisdiction" ruling upon the
provisions of Subsection 77-27-5(3), Utah Code; the Court of
Appeals was basically based upon the singe sentence from
9State vs Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Court of Appeals 1991).
See ¶ 11 of the DECISION. Subsection 77-27-5(3), Utah Code,
was, within the DECISION, identified but a single time---
i.e. ¶ 8 of the DECISION---but only in the context of
GARCIA's claim of "unconstitutionality" of the statute,
which issue has been DENIED "certiorari review" by the
Court.
Notwithstanding the relative clarity of the "no
judicial review of Board decisions" (paraphrased) text of
the statute, the State cites (page 6 within the "argument"
section of its BRIEF) numerous appellate cases---i.e. Foote
vs Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah Supreme Court
1991); Padilla vs Utah Board of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664 (Utah
Supreme Court 1997); and Preece vs House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah
Supreme Court 1994)---which seemingly run counter to the
clear thrust of the statute [77-27-5(3)]. So obviously,
Subsection 77-27-5(3) does not mean what it appears to say.
The Foote decision affirmatively indicates that if the
statute were to preclude all "judicial review", the statute
would be unconstitutional as violating the "open courts"
provisions of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution---an issue GARCIA has sought to raise in this
case. Perhaps now that the State has raised Section 77-27-
5(3) as an issue in the case, the Court should allow the
parties to argue its "unconstitutionality".
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The State's arguments, in various places within its
BRIEF, that GARCIA's sole remedy against the Board is
pursuant to Rule 65B, is flawed. GARCIA's fundamental claim,
to "set aside" the resultant "civil judgment" arising from
the "late" Board of Pardons "restitution order" is entirely
appropriate, under the Rules---for example, Rule 60, which
is directly on point---as well as case law decision,
including State vs Schultz, 2002 UT App 297, 56 P.3d 974
(Utah Court of Appeals 2002). GARCIA's "set aside" argument,
directed to the District Court and its "civil judgment", was
timely filed and appropriate in light of the facially-
obvious "lateness" of the Board's late-filed "restitution
order". See Subsections 77-27-6(2) and 77-27-6(4), Utah
Code.
IV
THE STATE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS
IS MISLEADING AND SIMPLY WRONG
On page 4 of its BRIEF the State, in its "summary of
argument" paragraphs, asserts that the "question in this
case" is not whether GARCIA may challenge the Board's
restitution order, but rather "how he may challenge it". The
concept is further identified on page 5 under the "Argument"
section of the State's BRIEF. [This newly-minted observation
and characterization (of opposing party's long-standing
position) certainly contradicts the State's (and/or the
Board's and the Debt Collection Office's) consistently
11
asserted positions: that GARCIA simply could not challenge
the Board's decision. Whether such disability arises from
the "no judicial review" provisions of Subsection 77-27-
5(3)---presently asserted by the State to be "determinative"
and "controlling", although not relied upon by the Court of
Appeals in its DECISION which this Court is presently
reviewing---or some other basis, the State's argument is
disingenuous. Indeed, the State expressly references [page
4, last two sentences of complete paragraph on page] the
statutory prohibition, without actually referring to the
specific statute.] The State agencies identified and argued
the "no jurisdiction/lost jurisdiction" issue (from Montoya)
before the District Court and renewed those claims before
the Utah Court of Appeals, which incorporated the "no
jurisdiction" basis into its DECISION.
The State's brazen attempt [page 4 of RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF] to infuse the "Rule 60(b) motions" into the Court of
Appeals "holding" (State's terminology) is an improper
extension of the DECISION, which "speaks for itself".
The State's mischaracterization [page 5 of its BRIEF]
as to GARCIA's lack of "challenge" to the Court of Appeals'
"construction of the statutory text" is erroneous and
misleading. GARCIA has always---and consistently---
challenged the Court of Appeals DECISION: initially, in his
"petition for rehearing" before the Court of Appeals, and
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later before this Court in his "petition for writ of
certiorari" and in his 30+ pages of "argument" in his
opening BRIEF. Those arguments (i.e. disregard of stare
decisis, disregard of statutory text, the "jurisdiction"
issue and so forth) "speak for themselves".
GARCIA's position vis-a-vis the DECISION is not
susceptible of simple analysis and easy dismissal. The
DECISION does undertake an apparent statutory
"construction", but that "construction" is fundamentally
flawed by the Court of Appeals' failure to APPLY the
operative statutory text: namely, the "within 60 days"
restriction contained within Subsection 77-27-6(4), which
the State herein characterizes as "determinative" and
"controlling".
The State's attempt to characterize GARCIA's claims as
an attempt to "review" the Board's decision is incorrect and
misleading. GARCIA's position on this narrow point has
always been to "set aside" the resulting "civil judgment"
which improperly arose from the "late" filing of the Board's
order. In this regard, the State's arguments and analysis
concerning the "extraordinary relief" remedy under Rule 65B
is just so much distraction: while such a litigation could
have theoretically been filed, it couldn't have been
undertaken within the context of the criminal case, as the
Board of Pardons was not at the time a party thereto. Even
13
if the Rule 65B claim had been filed, the supposed
"equitable remedy" against the Board to do something (i.e.
hold the statutorily-required hearing it never held) would
still have left the "civil judgment" untouched and in place.
GARCIA's "set aside" motion was timely made, in the proper
court which entered the "civil judgment" at issue in this
case.
V
THE Frito-Lay CASE IS TOTALLY INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE
The State's continued assertion of the 2009 decision of
this Court in the case of Frito-Lay vs Utah Labor
Commission, 2009 UT 71, 222 P.3d 55 (Utah Supreme Court
2009) as being applicable hereto is misleading. This is
nevertheless the situation, even though the Court of Appeals
incorporated the argument into the DECISION.
Frito-Lay holds that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
are not, per se, applicable to procedures followed in
adjudicatory hearings by administrative agencies. Okay, we
understand that. But that principle has absolutely nothing
to do with the present case. Again, the State attempts to
distract the focus away from the fundamental issue: that the
Board was "late" in filing its order.
The State's blatant attempt to distract the focus is
evidenced by the State's usage of almost two full pages
devoted to the Frito-Lay argument [pp. 7 and 8 of its
14
BRIEF], while the State has devoted but two paragraphs---one
on page 9 and one paragraph on page 10---to a discussion of
this Court's decision in the Laycock case. [See discussion
in depth in Point VI, immediately following.] The State
likewise gives extraordinarily superficial treatment---a
mere two paragraphs, consisting of but five sentences---to
Schultz. 
VI
THE STATE'S ANALYSIS OF LAYCOCK IS FLAWED AND SUPERFICIAL
The State's brief [one paragraph on Page 9 and one
paragraph on page 10 of its BRIEF] is woefully inadequate to
respond to the analysis raised by Petitioner GARCIA. On Page
10 the State asserts:
. . . Laycock does not discuss a criminal court's
post-sentencing jurisdiction. It [the Laycock
decision] acknowledges only that a party may
appropriately file a petition for an extraordinary
writ to challenge a decision where the party does
not have the right to appeal. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,
¶ 7.
Emphasis added. Bracketed text in the second sentence added
for clarity.
That the State reads Laycock so superficially is
incredible, if not troubling. In The State of Utah,
Petitioner vs Claudia Laycock, District Judge, 2009 UT 53,
214 P.3d 104 (Utah Supreme Court 2009), the Supreme Court
went to great lengths to explain "court-ordered
restitution", even in a post-sentencing situational context.
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Admittedly, Laycock did not, as the State correctly notes
[page 10 of its BRIEF], "discuss a criminal court's post-
sentencing jurisdiction". Page 10 of State's BRIEF.] But the
reason for that lack of discussion was obvious: everybody
knew that the District Court had jurisdiction. IF the
District Court would have no post-sentencing jurisdiction,
it would have been meaningless for the Supreme Court to
order Judge Laycock to order "complete restitution" several
years after the criminal sentence had been announced (in
2004), particularly in the face of the "within one year"
after sentencing requirements of the statute. The Attorney
General's "petition" for "extraordinary relief" against
Judge Laycock impliedly admitted and acknowledged the
"jurisdiction" the District Court had; otherwise, Laycock
could have never been filed in the first place. 
So the State's failure to properly analyze Laycock is
deeply troubling. To refer to a principle identified in
Paragraph 7 of a multi-page decision which extended across
page-after-page as being the "acknowledges only that"
(State's terminology, p. 10 of its BRIEF) evidences the
superficiality of the State's analysis of the case---a case
which the State itself filed.
16
VII
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO ANALYZE Schultz AND TO RESPOND TO
THE "STARE DECISIS" ARGUMENTS IS LIKEWISE
SUPERFICIAL AND INADEQUATE
Although the "stare decisis" arguments advanced by
GARCIA across almost ten pages of text [see APPELLANT'S
BRIEF, pp. 9-19], the State responded thereto with but two
paragraphs, consisting of a mere 5 sentences. Such a tepid,
superficial response to what will proved to be the
dispositive issue is troubling, if not worse. The brief
response is reminiscent of the State's similar response in
February 2016 to the Court of Appeals "supplemental briefing
order", wherein the Court of Appeals sought briefing on the
"effect" (Court of Appeals terminology) of its State vs
Schultz, 2002 UT App 297, 56 P.3d 974 (Utah Court of Appeals
2002), decision. The original STATE-submitted "supplemental
brief" consisted of approximately four pages, which omitted
any reference at all to Schultz. Later that day, a
"corrected" supplemental brief was filed, in which a couple
paragraphs---consisting of five or six sentences---addressed
Schultz. Perhaps the State is taking its "cue" from the
Court of Appeals and its DECISION: if we simply ignore
Schultz we won't have to deal with it. So we will (ignore
Schultz) and we'll pretend it doesn't exist.
The State's analysis is superficial and simply wrong.
It apparent attempt [page 9, second paragraph] to
17
distinguish Schultz from the instant situation because
Schultz arose in the context of a "challenge to the validity
of a continuing garnishment based on a restitution order"
[Id.] is meaningless. As previously noted extensively in
GARCIA'S PETITIONER'S BRIEF, Schultz held---repeated
numerous times---that the Board's restitution order was
invalid, because it was "late" in its making, and that the
Board had no jurisdiction to enter the order.
The State argues that Schultz did not discuss the
"jurisdiction" of the sentencing court. That's probably the
only truly-accurate statement made by the State in its
BRIEF. But that situation does not change the analysis nor
the result. The sentencing court was presumed to have
jurisdiction. So Schultz is binding precedent and the
principle of stare decisis was violated by the DECISION. Of
course the State made no attempt to respond to the "stare
decisis", because it could make no effective rebuttal
thereto.
The singular distinction between the instant case and
Schultz is NOT the "continuing garnishment" context. THE
single distinction in the instant case is the Legislature's
adoption---in 2005---the technical amendments to Subsection
77-27-6(4), and also in 77-27-6(2), adopting the "within 60
days" (of termination of sentence) requirement. While the
amendment gave the Board of Pardons an additional sixty days
18
in which to act, the Board was nevertheless "late" in making
and filing its "restitution order". So of course the State
wants to "sweep under the rug", as does the DECISION, this
unavoidable but nevertheless rather "inconvenient truth".
CONCLUSION
The State's BRIEF and the superficial and inapplicable
arguments and analysis contained therein are woefully
inadequate, on their face. The Court should easily recognize
the superficiality and dismiss the arguments.
The "bottom line" is unchanged. The Court of Appeals
DECISION fails to follow Schultz, and thus violates the
principle of "stare decisis", which is one of the bedrock
foundations of our system of law.
The DECISION fails to even recognize, let alone apply,
the dispositive nature of the "lateness" of the Board's
making as well as filing its "restitution order". These
failures invalidate---as per Schultz and certainly under the
statute---that filing and the "civil judgment" which
automatically arises therefrom.
Laycock implicitly overrules Montoya and its progeny;
the Supreme Court should now say so.
The Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals must be
overturned and the case remanded back to the Utah Court of
Appeals, with directions to remand the case back to the
District Court with instructions to set aside the resultant
19
"civil judgment". 
Petitioner should be awarded all his costs incurred
herein (at both appellate courts).
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument before the Court is requested.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of June, 2017.
  /s/Stephen G Homer
  STEPHEN G HOMER
  Attorney for Appellant-Petitioner
  DENNIS J GARCIA
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